Segue abaixo o abstract de um artigo que está na última edição da AER. O título do artigo é Incentives Work: Getting Teachers to Come to School (Esther Duflo, Rema Hanna and Stephen P. Ryan). Os autores usam dados de um experimento feito na Índia com o objetivo de reduzir as faltas (ausências) dos professores.
We use a randomized experiment and a structural model to test whether monitoring and financial incentives can reduce teacher absence and increase learning in India. In treatment schools, teachers' attendance was monitored daily using cameras, and their salaries were made a nonlinear function of attendance. Teacher absenteeism in the treatment group fell by 21 percentage points relative to the control group, and the children's test scores increased by 0.17 standard deviations. We estimate a structural dynamic labor supply model and find that teachers respond strongly to financial incentives. Our model is used to compute cost-minimizing compensation policies.
Link para o artigo AQUI.